Dialogue on Peace as the Presence of Justice: Ethical Reasoning as an Essential Learning Goal of Peace Education

An Invitation to Peace Educators
from Dale Snauwaert and Betty Reardon

As we look to the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the germinative source of the range of human rights standards adopted over the second half of the 20th century by the community of nations, we are dismayed at the lack of regard that community seems to hold for these standards. Intended as the guidelines for achieving essential conditions of a just and peaceful world society, they are hardly implemented and infrequently invoked.

The second decade of the 21st century witnesses "disregard and contempt for human rights" exceeding those that produced "the barbarous acts which…outraged the conscience of mankind…" This is a time when we have cause to question: Where now is such an active global conscience that gave rise to the response that produced the UDHR, adopted by acclamation of the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948? This apparent absence or obscuring of a sense of global ethics, poses ethical and pedagogical challenges to peace education that must be faced if the field is to be truly relevant to the present peace problematic that challenges the normative aspirations of peace education as never before.

While we are aware of the need for establishing new normative standards related to the new challenges, we also note that the norms established in the mid 20th century have an indispensable role in confronting the ethical issues arising in the current global order. We assert that the internationally agreed human rights standards provide a basic code of ethics of global citizenship, comprising essential substance for education, and for ethical reasoning and decision making; core skills to be developed by peace education. Furthermore, such learning should be intentionally embraced as a central purpose of peace education.

This dialogue on peace education is guided by two foundational assertions: peace as the presence of justice; and ethical reasoning as an essential learning goal of peace education. We invite peace educators everywhere to review and assess our dialogue and the challenges outlined, and to engage in similar dialogues and colloquies with colleagues who share the common goal of making education an effective instrument of peace. In this way we hope to inspire discourse on cultivating peace, human rights and the moral imperatives of justice; let us strive together to develop core learning pedagogies of ethical inquiry and moral reasoning as essentials of peace education.

A note on the meaning of the terms "ethical" and "moral" used in this dialogue. The terms ethical and moral are often either used synonymously or they are defined in distinct ways. In Reardon's previous work she conceives "ethical" reasoning broadly to include value inquiry, the process of providing justificatory reasons for principles of rights/justice, and the process of applying values and principles to specific cases (Betty A. Reardon, 2010; Betty A. Reardon & Snauwaert, 2011; Betty A. Reardon & Snauwaert, 2015). In Snauwaert's work he distinguishes these dimensions of normative reasoning as ethical value inquiry, moral reasoning, and moral judgment (Snauwaert, under review). In our dialogue below we refer to all three of these dimensions either separately or under the umbrella term of ethical reasoning.

1. Snauwaert: To begin our dialogue, we can reflect on the nature of peace. Peace has often been conceptualized as the *absence of violence*. However, instead of defining peace in terms of an absence of violence, which makes violence the operative concept, peace can be conceptualized as the *presence of justice*. Even from within the narrow perspective of peace as the absence of aggressive warfare, peace is a matter of justice, for security of person is a vital interest; persons have a basic human right to security. In turn, there is a duty to organize society in a way that avoids depriving persons of their right to security, protects them from threats to their security, and aids victims of the violation of their human right to security.

The right to security of person imposes duties onto the basic institutional structures of society as a matter of justice. When the existence of structural, systemic injustice is taken into consideration, the parameters of peace expand to include basic questions of social justice relating to a significant range of rights and duties. From this perspective, peace constitutes a social system of cooperation regulated by principles of justice and ethical values essential for the pursuit of a good life. Establishing and sustaining peace within all levels of society, local, national, international, and global, is an urgent moral imperative of justice. Peace as a matter of justice, consequently, calls for an educational approach that is designed to cultivate the capacities of moral reasoning, reflection, and sound judgment in present and future citizens. Could you reflect on the pedagogical processes most suited to this aim?

Reardon: My first and fundamental assertion about the relevant pedagogy is that the nature of the learning space or environment is a primary determinant of what will be learned. If the learning intention is the development of capacities for ethical reflection and decision making, then the environment itself must manifest a system of ethics. In the case of the arguments we make here, it must manifest respect for and enactment of human rights. The "what and how" of manifesting human rights in learning spaces will be addressed as we continue this dialogue.

The learning intention of developing ethical capacities infuses the way I see this first point of your argument that peace is the presence of justice, a public goal to be reached through citizens exercising their ethical capacities, which I posit as learning objectives. Such is essential to building the requisite "duties into social structures." Social structures, as we teach in peace education, reflect the values of the societies that construct them. They may appear abstract, but they only manifest in concrete human actions. What we aim for are operative social values derived from deep and robust ethical reflection, a goal that, in turn requires a pedagogy of ethical inquiry. For the educator, the task is devising and posing queries most likely to produce relevant reflection. Indeed, I would argue that in our present circumstances all citizens should be grappling with the formation of such questions to be raised in all public spaces.

The inquiry could begin with queries to elicit an assessment of the ethics of the learning environment. I would begin by examining your first point about expanding the definition of peace as an absence of violence, to a more positive definition of peace as the presence of justice. I would like to question the indicators of each definition, and how they might be affecting the relationships that comprise the learning environment; whether and how they might be changed to facilitate all learners achieving their respective learning objectives.

There are other pedagogical treasures suggested by your first point that I hope will appear again in our exchanges. Perhaps your second point regarding cultivating peace as an urgent moral imperative of justice will surface some of them as it poses other pedagogical possibilities. Among them, inquiring into a conceptual definition of justice would be a fruitful starting point.

2. Snauwaert: Yes, that inquiry is essential; if we conceive peace as a moral imperative of justice and understand the basic aim of peace education in terms of the pursuit of justice, then we need to explain further the nature of justice. Justice refers to what each person is due or justified in demanding, as well as what we owe to each other; our duties to each other. The fulfillment of what we are due and thus what we owe each other is a matter of how society is organized in terms of its basic institutional structure. Justice does not refer to the whole of morality, including our conception of the good life and what morality demands of us in our personal relationships with others, among many other considerations. It pertains to the organization and functioning of social institutions (political, legal, economic, educational, etc.), specifically the integrated system of social institutions that comprise the basic structure of society. One general approach to normative political philosophy suggests that a just society is built on and through the vast array of ethical and moral relationships and interactions between individuals. A just society is contingent upon the moral soundness of such relationships (May, 2015). However, it can be argued that the normative quality of relationships between individuals is contingent upon the basic institutional structure of society, and if that structure is unjust, then it is difficult at best for individuals to engage in ethical relationships. As the philosopher John Rawls noted:

> Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust (Rawls, 1971, p. 1).

The basic structure of society is, so to speak, the water in which we swim; if the water is polluted, that pollution conditions the quality of our swimming together. An important way to conceive the subject of justice is to conceive it as the terms or principles that regulate the basic institutional structure of society.

If justice pertains to what each person is due *and* what we owe to each other in light of what we are due, then the principles of justice would necessarily

express what each person is *justified* in demanding as a "moral claim on the organization of society" (Pogge, 2001, p. 200) and what the society is obligated to provide each person as a matter of justice. Given this conception of the subject of justice, what follows pedagogically?

Reardon: Following on my focus in our first exchange on the learning environment as a laboratory for testing civic values and competencies, I will focus in this second exchange on your assertion that *"A just society is contingent on and through an array of ethical and moral relationships and interactions between individuals."* And your statement that *"…justice would express what each person is justified in demanding of society."* As a teacher, I see these assertions as essential to cultivating learning relationships and interactions in the learning environment that would constitute a human web of mutual fulfillment of the *claims* each learner *has a right* to make upon their learning community. Justification of those claims would offer learners opportunities to engage in the very form of ethical reflection integral to responsible civic action toward the realization of human rights. It is citizen education in a form so necessary at this time.

The fulfillment of claims of individual learners is the responsibility of all other learners in the web of interactions that comprise the learning process, as the fulfillment of claims to rights is the responsibility of the society and the institutions established to carry out the responsibility. In the case of education, schools and universities are the institutions established to fulfill claims to learning. In each class or learning community the learning of each derives in significant part from the learning of all, as the learning of all in the community is in general the aggregation of the learning of each individual, mirroring the relationship of the fulfillment of the human rights of one citizen redounding to greater assurance of the rights of all.

Individual learnings, while varied are part of the total learnings of the community. The sum learning is the product of the relationships and interactions that comprise a *learning community*, a community being persons joined together in pursuit of their common welfare and shared social purposes. A learning community is brought into being by an intention to pursue learning that all agree serves their welfare, an intention they hold is best pursued in community - rather than individually or in non-communal groups - that will contribute to the achievement of commonly held social purposes.

The ethicality and efficacy of learning communities are determined by the degree and quality of justice that they manifest. Successful learning communities

are those in which individual claims are assessed in terms of their potential effects on the common interest, and in which all learning *benefits* of the community are fully and equally shared. Effective learning communities interpret *harms* to an individual's learning as justice deficits to all. The concept of individual human rights deemed by the UDHR to be the foundation of "justice and peace in the world," is commonly interpreted as meaning that the violation of the rights of one constitutes a deficit of justice and peace for all (i.e., "An injustice anywhere is an injustice everywhere.") So, fulfilling claims of individual learners serves to assure that justice and peace are experienced – and learned from – by all in a learning community.

What I write here in terms of abstract principles can and should be translated into actual teaching-learning behaviors. As we look to educating toward the principles set forth in this your second point, I would assert that peace educators have a *duty* and a *responsibility* to devise and practice methods consistent with a just learning environment. The duty is imposed by the assumed, if not stipulated, moral codes of the teaching profession. The responsibility derives from the personal and individual professional commitments and capacities peace educators have developed through practice, and recognition of the social significance of their teaching stance and methodology. The learners we guide have a human right to claim nothing less than the fulfillment of these duties and responsibilities; failing to do so will serve as a major obstacle to educating for the ethical decision making upon which a just civic order depends.

3. Snauwaert: As you suggest, the claims and obligations of justice, which form the ethical core of peace education, can be expressed in the language of rights and duties, and therefore, peace educators have a moral duty to provide the opportunity for human rights learning and a learning environment consistent with justice. Your points here are of great importance. The idea of human rights is the dominant way of articulating the demands of justice in the modern world (Bobbio, [1990] 1996; Falk, 2000; Glover, 2000; Gutmann, 2001; Ignatieff, 2001; Jones, 1999; Perry, 1998; Vincent, 1986). Rights talk has become the "*lingua franca* of global moral thought" (Ignatieff, 2001), p.53). Rights are justified demands for the socially guaranteed enjoyment of ethical goods. In addition, some rights are "basic," in the sense that they are necessary for the enjoyment of all other rights (Shue, 1980, p. 19). A right is a *rational* basis for a *justified* demand in the sense that it provides a compelling normative *reason* for the demand being met. Rights have to do with the activity of claiming, which is a rule-governed activity: "To have a claim … is to have a case meriting consideration … to have reason or grounds that put one in a position to engage in [legitimate] claiming (Feinberg, 2001, p. 185)."

As such, rights can be conceived as protections against coercion, deprivation, and inhumane treatment. Rights protect the powerless from the powerful (Bobbio, [1990] 1996; Ignatieff, 2001; Jones, 1999; Vincent, 1986). As Norberto Bobbio asserts, human rights arise out of "specific conditions characterized by the embattled defense of new freedoms against old powers (Bobbio, [1990] 1996, p. xi)." R. J Vincent maintains that they are "a weapon of the weak against the strong (Vincent, 1986, p. 17)." In this sense rights are political, in that they are means of adjudicating conflict and serve as a means to protect the interests of individuals (Ignatieff, 2001). Rights thus define what the individual is due, is justified in demanding/claiming, and/or is protected from, and, as such, constitute one of two core dimensions of justice.

Reardon: There are two concepts in these assertions about rights that are integral to the social purposes and civic learning goals of peace education: first, the notion of rights as ethical goods that you defined in another exchange that I paraphrase as: vital basic interests, substantive or abstract, a person has reason to value; and second, your concluding statement on the rules-based political nature of rights. The learning goals I posit as the intended outcome of secondary and tertiary study of these ideas are the capacities to recognize, define and pursue ethical goods, and the skills to engage in the politics of realizing them.

While you speak in terms of the rights of the individual, the assertion that it is society that is obligated to fulfill justified rights puts the learning discourse in the communal realm of second-generation human rights, codified in the International Convention on Social and Economic Rights. The norms or rules of the Convention were generated from the fundamental concepts of needs required for human wellbeing, previously and more succinctly identified in the UDHR. Within the framework of your assertions, the claim that all members of a society, individually and collectively, can make for fulfillment of these needs is that they are universal requirements to maintain life, physical and social wellbeing.

Reflection on rights so conceived, essentially recognizing universal human needs, could lead learners to a comprehension that human beings are one single species who share a common destiny. The species, generally referred to as humanity is, like societies, a subject of rights. For example, the UN recently declared humanity's right to a healthy environment. The fact of universal human needs combined with the concept of a singular humanity manifest both substantive and abstract ethical goods, the claims to which raise fundamental ethical and moral issues. The current fragility of the wellbeing and the future survival of humanity pose the overriding political problematic that peace

education has an unavoidable ethical responsibility to confront. As such, it should be both a primary focus and a constant subtext of all peace education inquiries into human rights and any and all forms of justice.

The primary focus and subtext put the requisite peacelearning directly in the context of the current cultural, social, and political conflicts, rawer and more virulent than any faced since human rights became recognized international norms. Peace education is challenged to guide learners in acquiring political skills that enable them to effectively apply human rights to the resolution of conflict, making your concluding assertion an excellent articulation of the positing of this goal. I urge all peace educators to consider your statement as the justification of how we can seek to fulfill this crucial ethical obligation of our time.

4. Snauwaert: Given the importance of rights and duties that you suggest are the core purposes of peace education, it would be fruitful to elaborate further on the idea of rights and duties. The idea that rights are justified claims is comprised of two elements: the claim, and its justification. Claims necessarily have a content. When a claim is made it is always a claim for something, and this raises the question of the content of rights—*what* are we justified in claiming? Moreover, justified claims are necessarily addressed to others (Forst, 2012). "To have a claim-right is to be owed a duty by another or others" (Jones, 2001, p. 53). A basic element of a right, therefore, is the identification of a duty generated by the right (Shue, 1980).

In turn, duties entail the identification of the agent(s) who holds the duty generated by the right. This identification also entails a justification for imposing the duty onto the specified agent (Jones, 2001). Rights necessarily entail duties and thus the identification of who is obligated to guarantee the protection of those rights. The imposition of the duty onto a specific agent is contingent upon the type of duty involved, the capability of the agent to fulfill the duty, and a moral justification for the imposition of the duty.

This discussion of duties invoked by rights suggests that, as we discussed above, the subject of justice is the basic institutional structure of society (Rawls, 1971). As Thomas Pogge argues, rights are "moral claims upon the organization of society" (Pogge, 2001, p. 200), and thus are matters of social justice. It is the primary duty of the state, of government, to aid, avoid depriving, and protect the rights of its citizens. The idea that rights entail duties is a foundational idea of justice. Rights as justified claims to, and protections of, one's vital interests thus call for the institutional structures of society, its' legal and governmental systems, to be just.

It is essential to point out that citizens, in turn, have a duty to support the establishment and sustainability of just institutions. This duty includes a duty to resist injustice. If we are due the protection of our rights, and social institutions, specifically the government, hold the duties of aid and protection, then individual citizens hold a basic duty to support just social and political institutions, and to resist and reform institutions, laws, policies, customs, and practices that fail to provide that protection, or are intentionally designed to violate the rights of certain persons.

Reardon: The philosophic concepts on which you build these assertions are the foundation for education for ethical reasoning, and various core skills of responsible citizenship. They also provide opportunities for reflection on language, the words we use to interpret the world, and to articulate how we hope to change it. *Agency, content, duty, institutional structures, and justification* are terms that should be in the vocabulary of all peace educators, and the ideas they express – even if in different words – should be familiar to and valued by the citizens of any society that purports to seek justice.

To achieve familiarity, the curricular task for basic citizenship education is to interpret these concepts in the language of the ordinary citizen. If sustainable justice is to be achieved through the realization of human rights, the foundational ideas of a philosophy of justice need to be familiar to and valued by the general citizenry. For that reason, these observations are formulated with secondary school and beginning level undergraduate teachers in mind. Secondary school and the first years of undergraduate education are the learning levels most relevant to the purposes that inform this exchange. These are years during which young citizens begin to take up action in pursuit of the values they hope society will manifest, to confront the complexities of realizing justice. Complexities are revealed as the meanings and usage of the relevant words that articulated the concepts are to be explored, seeking the clarity of meaning and purpose essential to political efficacy.

Conceptual clarity is important for the content of all curriculum design and has been especially emphasized in peace education. I would argue that informing values and the philosophy of purpose should also be clearly stated by the designers. Concepts - i.e., ideas and the words that articulate them - are the primary medium of the discourse of peace education. The philosophic concepts you invoke in this statement should be the medium that peace education employs to explore the complexities of the problematic of justice. As the connotations that

the words bring to mind are considered, learners clarify the denoted and connoted meanings of the relevant concepts and how they operate realizing justice.

Complementarities as well as contradictions among the core concepts and meanings of the words we use to express them can be discerned, invoking more complex thinking a step away from the bifurcation of the *either/or* framing that dominates consideration of ethical issues in most current political discourse. Establishing complementarities, the possibilities of *also/and* as framing is grounds for projecting various alternative approaches to any given problem of justice. Assessing multiple alternatives and engaging in values reflection in selecting among choices for action are practices prominent in the pedagogy of peace education. Learning to assess various possibilities for action and analyzing the values that infuse them, nourishes the will to act, to exercise agency. Proposing and assessing alternative courses of action is a capacity that well serves those who intend to be agents of justice.

The assertion that claiming rights requires *an agent*, is one of the factors that makes the development of capacities for effective agency an imperative of peace education. The learner/citizen, thinking as agent, must identify and choose courses of action to realize the claim, i.e., to pursue justice by providing remedy for a harm or access to a benefit though one or a combination of the alternatives. The efficacy of the action will likely be determined by the rigor of the assessment of alternatives and sharpness of the values analysis, and certainly on the articulation of the *content* of the claim.

Developing the *content* of a claim (referred to in a previous exchange as *substance)* – describing the benefit to which the claimant aspires or the harm for which remedy is sought - is essentially the same process of identification and definition of the injustices deemed to be the causes and consequences of World War II that produced the UDHR; and in subsequent decades, as other harms were identified, the international human rights standards now recognized – though not fully observed – by the world community. The UDHR and the international conventions and covenants are essential material for any and all curricula intended to develop capacities for the pursuit justice.

Knowing the standards and the history of the evolution of human rights concepts brings a human dimension to the inquiry through which the *content* of a claim is conceptualized. Accounts of actual experiences can serve to humanize this history and can be woven into curricula through the stories of how society came to see harms as injustices to be remedied, stories that we call history. Study of actual cases illuminate the actual suffering of harms or struggles to acquire

benefits; the stuff of great literature and films, long used to good effect in human rights curricula. Human experience is the most motivating framework for inquiry into conceptualizing the claim.

As illustration of a possible line of inquiry, I suggest here a few sample queries. These queries are intended to provide deeper understanding of experiences that lead to awareness of the injustice that gave rise to the claim in question. An inquiry establishing the *content* of a claim might begin with asking, "What actually is being experienced or was experienced by the claimant?" Then with a view toward establishing grounds for *justifying* the claim, "Is the harm or denial of a benefit the claimant experiences addressed in international human rights standards? If not, on what grounds might the claim be argued? Are there applicable national, local, or customary laws to be invoked? How might these laws be used to argue for the claim*?"* Here, the point is to clarify the injustice, establish that it is recognized as a violation of rights, make the case that justice demands the harm be remedied or the benefit provided and awaken in the agent a motivation to act to fulfill the claim as a personal responsibility and a civic duty.

Fulfilling of personal and civic obligations leads the citizen/learner to seek out the *institutional structures* designed to realize justice, such as those intended to enact human rights standards. Such seeking facilitates understanding of how justice is pursued in the public sphere and imparts knowledge of the institutional procedures for the remediation of harms that society designates as inconsistent with its fundamental values.

Peace pedagogy should aim to cultivate comprehension of the evolution of how societies came to recognize harms as contradictory to their sense of what is right. That comprehension could be achieved in reviewing the conceptualization and encoding of those human rights standards, such as the human rights of women and the rights of the child, as political processes in which, citizen *agents* took responsibility to actively pursue justice as a civic duty. The complementarity of *also/and* framing of responsibility and duty, I argue, is more likely to achieve a more genuine and sustainable quality of justice than justice pursued only through responsibility *or* duty. Authentic justice is the consequence of wanting for others the rights and benefits we hope to enjoy ourselves. It derives largely from the acknowledgement that equity in the sharing of social goods is mutually beneficial to all members of society, and that every possible means should be used to pursue it. Pursuing authentic justice invokes the complementarity of *morality/ethics.* Morals, or inwardly held convictions of what is right and good, are usually acquired from family, religious teaching, or other authoritative sources; ethics are derived from demonstrable principles of fairness, justice and equity. The origins

of the morality/ethics complementarity and application are similar to those of duties/responsibilities.

Duty and responsibility both have roles in the *justification* of claims. Together they can provide a wide range of arguments, principles, and standards to establish that support fulfilling a claim. Indeed, j*ustification* should be the cornerstone of a peace and justice pedagogy. It calls for the problem analysis integral to peace pedagogy, but also and particularly for the *ethical reasoning* so sorely needed and tragically absent it today's political discourse. Considering the multiple crises that now overwhelm the pursuit of justice, questions of basic needs, human dignity, and the legality of circumstances in which they are denied, now addressed by but few active citizens and fewer policy makers, needs to be central to all policy discourse. It is imperative that peace education place a high priority on a capacity for ethical reasoning as a primary educational goal. For without such capacity, citizens are not likely to function as responsible and efficacious agents of justice. Ethical reasoning is integral and essential to peace education's long advocated educational goal of political efficacy. Ethical reasoning for political efficacy was never more needed than now when Earth itself calls us to act to remedy the multiple harms that can lead to the end of the whole human experiment.

5. Snauwaert: Yes, the necessity of developing the capacities of ethical reasoning and judgment among citizens cannot be overestimated; ethical reasoning is integral to and essential for peace education. To say that the society is just or unjust and thus the principles of justice that regulate it are justifiable, requires a process of offering reasons that verify the normative validity of those principles. Educating for and about rights and duties is, therefore, central to peace education, which calls for a theoretical and practical inquiry into pedagogical approaches to the development of the capacities to assert and justify one's rights and to understand, affirm, and enact the duties entailed in rights.

However, the principles of justice that serve as the regulating rules of institutions "must be not only verified but also validated. It is not enough to show that *if* certain criteria [rules] *are* employed, then a thing must be said to have a certain degree of 'goodness' [justice]; we must also show that these criteria *ought* to be employed" (Baier, 1958, p. 75). So, in ethical reasoning about the terms of social cooperation necessary for peace and justice, we need to not only consider the terms themselves, that is, principles of justice and shared political values, but also the criteria or standards of validity upon which we can assess the justifiability of those values and principles.

The judgment or claim that a principle is right or just presupposes that we have reason to affirm it, and that reason is not any reason as such but a justifiable and thus valid reason. "We are thinking of the conditions which something must satisfy in order to be properly called a [political value and/or principle of justice] … (Baier, 1958, p. 181)." Claims of justice thus presuppose criteria for the determination of the justifiability of reasons. It can be argued that the process of moral reasoning and judgment is one of deliberating and offering reasons that justify those claims, including claims about the justifiability of social norms and institutions (Baier, 1954, 1958; Forst, 2012; Habermas, 1990, 1996; Rawls, 1971; Rawls & Kelly, 2001; Scheffler, 1981; Singer, 2011). As Thomas Scanlon suggests: "If we could characterize the method of reasoning through which we arrive at judgments of right and wrong, and could explain why there is good reason to give judgments arrived at in this way the kind of importance that moral judgments are normally thought to have, then we would, I believe, have given sufficient answer to the question of the subject matter of right and wrong" (Scanlon, 1998, p. 2).

From this perspective, we can look to the nature of reasoning itself, specifically, its *presuppositions*, for the criteria of justification. Moral reasoning is a form of argumentation and discourse that contains unavoidable "presuppositions," which are the *constitutive elements* of reasoning in the sense that they define what reasoning is. They are necessary conditions or predicates for the very possibility of reasoning (Brune, Stern, & Werner, 2017; Stern, 2021). Presuppositions are analogous to the primary rules of a game that define what the game is, such that those rules are necessary conditions for the very possibility of playing the game. You cannot play a game of chess, for example, without knowing and accepting the rules that define chess. The presuppositions of moral reasoning are logically necessary if one is to engage in the practice of moral reasoning (Habermas, 1990, 1993; Kant, 1991 [1797]; May, 2015; Peters, 1966; Watt, 1975).

Following the insight of John Rawls, we can invoke the elements of fairness as the presuppositions of moral reasoning that serve as the basic criteria for the normative justification of principles of justice (Rawls, 1971; Rawls & Kelly, 2001). These elements of fairness serve as basic moral reasons for the justification of principles and values. It can be argued that there are at least four *criteria of fairness*: equality, recognition, reciprocity, and impartiality.

Regarding equality, fairness is grounded in a recognition of and respect for the intrinsic equality of persons (Rawls, 1971; Rawls & Kelly, 2001). A foundation of moral reasoning is the normative assertion of equality, the

presupposition that every human being should be considered as possessing an equal, inherent value (Kymlicka, 1990; Snauwaert, 2020). Regarding recognition, the possibility of moral relationships between persons, and when structured politically, between citizens, is grounded in and made possible by the reciprocal recognition of each person's equal dignity and right to freedom—recognition of persons as free and equal (Fukuyama, 1992, 2018; Honneth, 2015, 2021; Rawls, 2000; Williams, 1997; Zurn, 2015).

Furthermore, moral reasoning and justification is a demand for reasons that can be *accepted* by others (Forst, 2012; Habermas, 1990, 1993; Scanlon, 1998). It constitutes *a reciprocity of mutual agreement*, which requires that the terms that regulate the moral and political relationship between citizens must be acceptable to all affected. The terms must be such that no reasonable person would have grounds to reject them (Forst, 2012; Rawls, 1993; Rawls & Freeman, 1999; Rawls & Kelly, 2001; Scanlon, 1998). In turn, to achieve *reciprocity* the claim or norm must be free of the bias of exclusive self-interest; that is, it must be *impartial*. To gain legitimate general acceptance the moral claim or principle must be impartial, in the sense that it is good for all (Habermas, 1990). "Bare-faced appeal to self-interest will not do" (Singer, 2011, p. 93).

These criteria are the presuppositions of fairness in the sense that they shape the meaning of fairness. As mentioned above, these criteria of fairness are analogous to the basic rules of a game, for as the basic rules of a game define the game and form the basis of its secondary rules. The criteria of fairness define the standards for the justification of principles of justice, including rights (Snauwaert, under review). For example, a right to freedom of conscience is justifiable because it applies equally to all, recognizes each person as free and equal, is not met with reasonable rejection by believers and nonbelievers alike, and is impartial in that it favors no one's particular self-interest. On the other hand, it can be argued, for example that the principle of "separate but equal" is unjustifiable for it treats persons unequally, recognizes them as inferior, persons treated unequally have valid reason to reject the principle, and it serves the self-interests of a particular social group and not the common good.

As outlined previously, in this dialogue we hope to inspire discourse on cultivating peace, human rights and the moral imperatives of justice, and to develop ideas for pedagogies of ethical inquiry and moral reasoning as essentials of peace education. Above we have shown how the presuppositions of the elements of fairness, when applied to moral reasoning, can provide essential standards of validity for principles of justice. Developing these capacities of moral reasoning and judgement among citizens is fundamental to the goals and

pedagogy of peace education. Educating about rights, duties, and developing capacities to discern, assert and justify one's rights while working to understand and create the social and political cooperation necessary for peace and justice to prevail are tall orders, no doubt.

Betty, your pioneering writing and work over many decades continues to demonstrate a deep recognition and comprehension of the fundamental importance of the political in all its dimensions, including an incisive understanding of society's political terrain. Could you expand our dialogue by discussing the current socio-political terrain and what further capacities citizens need to develop to become politically astute, efficacious, and educated for ethical reasoning in this moment of history?

Reardon: When you call for a "theoretical and practical inquiry" into a general pedagogy in education to understand and affirm rights and enact duties, you call for a mapping of a broader conceptual range than we have thus far considered, which also involves taking into account the political realities as the context for the process of consideration. Your call requires addressing both the political context of the pursuit and the requisite capacities to equip individual citizens and societies to campaign for and to maintain a more just social order - if and when it is achieved.

Just as we need to translate the philosophic conceptual base for the pursuit of justice into ordinary language, familiar to the general citizenry, we need to consider the relevant socio-political terrain in which learner/citizens are to exercise agency. Today that terrain is fraught, rent by ideological divisions, conflicting values, hatred of difference, and contempt for truth, all antithetical to respect for human rights, and the enactment of duties to fulfill them; the context itself is an impediment to justice and to the ethical reasoning its achievement requires.

With that terrain in mind, I propose three additional concepts to the taxonomy we have thus far established: *integrity, accountability,* and *audacity.* These concepts pertain in all political contexts but demand particular attention in the design of a relevant pedagogy in our present situation. Audacity, the propensity to take bold risks, often connotes lack of civility or rudeness. However, even while seeking more civility in political discourse, the present *moral/ethical* necessity to break through silent acquiescence to blatant injustice and painfully evident authoritarianism running rampant over the institutions charged with delivering justice, demand nothing less than "speaking truth to power." In this reference to *moral/ethical,* as noted, I invoke a complementarity

such as that of *responsibility/duty*. To me, the two concepts are not synonymous, so much as providing a kind of synergy of distinct but related, equally essential efforts toward a common purpose, i.e., making sound personal and political value judgments so as to apply normatively consistent values to all realms of the justice problematic.

I would designate the three concepts I am adding to this glossary for education for ethical reasoning as *capacities*, human abilities to be developed through intentional learning. They are, as well, what Douglas Sloan has referred to as *qualities* (Sloan, 1983, 1997), i.e., individual personal characteristics to be brought forth as learners do the inner work of reflecting on what they truly believe to be just responses to actual cases of rights violations and/or to particular claims to rights.

I put forth these conceptual pairs within the *also/and* mode of thinking, previously advocated, believing that mode to hold some promise of mending the fissures, dividing a society deeply wounded by political bifurcation. The ideological and normative differences among us compound the difficulties of assuring rights and enacting duties, and thus impede justice. While steadfast values commitment would be a desired developmental goal, we must recognize that personal political values are in as much need of reflective review as are public norms and legal standards. The three concepts and their complements, outlined below are integral to that review.

Integrity/reflexivity is a synergic conceptual pair that most clearly manifests the imperative of reflective review. *Integrity,* connoting wholeness of person wherein one's behaviors are consistent with her articulated values, is the quality most lacking in present leadership and too many of their followers. Craven behavior, guided by narrow and exclusionary interests, totally antithetical to the principles of the universality of human rights, govern both discourse and policy making. An aura of anti-reflective, self-righteousness prevails on both sides of this polarized society, ungrounded moral certainties propel us toward greater and greater national disasters, consigning more and more to conditions under which their most fundamental rights are denied.

The spirit of open inquiry is moribund. Consideration that there may be flaws in one's values or the thinking which produced them is seen as weakness, or worse, compromising with the "other side." *Authentic integrity* cannot be sustained without being subject to regular *reflective* examination to assess personal values in terms of how they affect one's views on current public issues and controversies. *Reflexivity* helps to maintain integrity by enabling us to

regularly shed the light of reality on our inner-most values and how they affect our relationships, behaviors, and stances on issues of justice. The political efficacy of agents quite likely depends on both elements of this pair of complementary concepts. Integrity calls us to hold ourselves to the same standards as those to which we hold our political opponents. Regular reflective examination of our own morality and ethics may help make that possible.

Whereas I assert that *integrity* is most relevant to the person, the individual citizen, clearly, I also assert that it pertains to individuals in public positions, especially positions in the *institutions* intended to protect human rights and to defend and/or dispense justice. Beyond that *accountability* is especially important for those who hold public positions. Paring it with its complement, *compliance* makes it more possible for public servants to fulfill the duties that accrue to the offices they hold.

The conceptual pair of *accountability/compliance* describes complementary behaviors that are important in assigning and accepting responsibility for fulfillment of duties as functionaries of public institutions. In its full sense these behaviors are likely to be evident in officials who also have personal *integrity* as well a strong sense of civic responsibility and a commitment to the public they serve. Such is not always the case, yet public servants can serve adequately in light of *accountability and compliance* as they fulfill the basic civic functions assigned. This conceptual pair assures the possibility that justice can be dispensed, even in the absence of civil servants lacking the preferred qualities of personal *morality* and *integrity*. Indeed, compliance with public norms and legal standards can be a limited but sufficient basis of a reasonably fair society, one that might well be advanced to a more robust condition of justice, when elements of the society mobilize for it. Mobilizations arise out of growing public justification of claims or growing consciousness of an injustice. They have been effective in achieving compliance and sometimes have exacted accountability.

Audacity/prudence come into play in responsible civic action based on reasonable and reasoned public discourse. Audacity is generally understood to be a propensity to take bold risks. Risk taking, an essential peacemaking capacity and a personal attribute of persons of integrity, exercised in publicly challenging an injustice, has made possible most of the legal standards by which we justify claims. For the individual citizen whose conscience demands response to any of the many injustices still tolerated by societies, audacity is a liberating quality that enables her to risk retaliation by institutional authorities, governments, religions, universities, corporations, and businesses, as well as groups who believe they are benefited by that injustice. Whistle blowers, like prisoners of conscience risk jail

and/or exile, yet their "speaking truth to power" can sometimes turn the public toward justice.

None-the-less, political efficacy frequently demands that conscience be tempered by taking into account all elements that might affect an audacious, morally inspired act. So, we must educate, as well, for *prudence* and strategic discernment, hoping to avoid self-righteous self-sacrifice, by taking actions that are more practical within the given context. Educating for prudent assessment of the potential consequences and efficacy of actions for justice should be included among pedagogies for development of ethical reasoning.

Previously, I recommended that justice curricula should include the historic evolution of human rights standards. As an extension of that recommendation, I suggest teaching that awakens awareness of the politics of conscience that produced the evolution. Capacities such as *political discernment* and qualities such as *prudence* and *moral courage* are characteristic of those who engage in a politics of conscience that have energized human rights movements. The educational goal advocated is the formation of citizens as *principled and prudent risk takers,* likely to be *politically effective agents* in the pursuit of justice.

Our present context demands all possible efforts to transcend the lack of ethics and the moral inconsistencies that plague public life. It demands of us as persons that we act according to our fundamental inner sense of what is right; as citizens to engage in principled reasoning based on recognized norms of justice, as participants in a given political context to act on what we can ascertain to be the truth of "the facts on the ground;" and as peace educators to devise a pedagogy to prepare all citizens to do so, as well. The rights and justice pedagogy we devise must be directed toward the invocation of profound moral reflection in concert with the exigent exercise of ethical reasoning.

Fulfilling those civic and professional obligations is certainly a tall order, inevitably involving risks, some of them in the sensitive process of initiating moral reflection. The moral/ethical dissonance of the present political context suggest the need for safe learning spaces for individuals to dare to delve into that part of the self in which resides our personal morality, a sense of what is truly good and evidently right. We may not enter that space with the learner, only assure its availability. Ours is not the task of formulating personal morality. None-the-less we have a responsibility to make it possible for learners to become aware of the morality that actual guides their thinking and its origins, be they religion,

family, ideology or personal or historic experience - and how it affects their identities and behaviors.

We have an even greater responsibility to assure the same for ourselves. As peace educators, aspiring to integrity, we should be fully aware of own personal values, assuring that no matter how strongly committed we may be to those personal values, they are not at direct play in our teaching, nor the basis on which we take positions and actions regarding public issue in general and the pursuit of justice in particular.

Regarding pedagogical principles, first and foremost, a relevant pedagogy, in distinguishing between personal morality and public ethics, would make it clear that in a diverse society, the personal realm must not be the basis of public policy. It would demonstrate that when it is, it constitutes an egregious violation of the rights of those who hold different moral values. Still, it is to be hoped that consistency of values between personal morality and ethical principles would be consistent in persons of integrity, in clear contrast to the moral hypocrisy and ignorance of standards of justice that now characterizes our politics. We need a pedagogy that capacitates citizens to bring sound value judgments into our political conversations.

Preparation for making sound judgments requires opportunities for all members of any learning community to be introduced to the social norms and legal standards that should be common knowledge among the citizenries. Learners could be guided in practice to review, assess and apply these norms. Such opportunities might be introduced through communal learning exercises, and actual practice of engagement in ethical reasoning in the conduct of simulated public discourse on the justice problematic as it is manifest in current issues.

Hands on exercises, simulations and experiential learning are the major teaching modes that I believe would be most effective in a pedagogy to develop moral reflection and ethical reasoning intended to develop capacities for political efficacy. Elements of experiential learning and practice of the requisite reflection and reasoning are integral to the following suggestions for a pedagogy comprising *inquir*y, *problem posing and case studies*. These suggestions are very limited guidelines, offered as a starting point for a more fully developed pedagogy to be devised and elaborated by many peace educators, adapting the general approach to their own particular contexts.

A form of *inquiry* especially designed for the learning of normative assessment skills and for the development of strategic planning competencies

would involve more pointed and specific questions than the open-ended queries usually posed in peace education. Peace education queries are usually formulated to elicit multiple responses. In this case we seek a narrower range of responses based on the norms that are relevant to justification of claims, and appropriate to formulating strategies for their recognition and fulfillment. Questions or tasks posed in a form that calls the learner into an assessment process wherein for example the utility of particular norms might be weighed. The formation of the questions is the most significant aspect of the pedagogy.

Problem posing, a process in which morals and ethics are the determining factors, would involve reading the political context in which a moral or ethical decision is to be made. A review of interests at play, who holds them, how they affect the possibilities for the efficacy of any action considered and identifying commonalities among contentious factions, are examples that could establish context to begin problem posing as a learning process. A harm inflicted or a claim being made would be identified, and elements of the context be integrated into the problematic to address with strategies for resolution in the form of remedy for the harm or fulfillment of the claim. It should be acknowledged that some of the strategies proposed might well require *audacity,* and *prudence* certainly should be factored into the actions considered. The risk factor is further reason for assuring awareness of political realities.

Case studies, human experiences as the curricular content of the pedagogy, could be similar to the stories that we recount as history. For decades, cases have been employed as devices to teach moral decision-making, and in teaching human rights law. Cases can be based on the substance/content of claims, taking the form of narratives to which, the learners can more easily relate than to the abstractions of a "docket case". They might also be drawn from media accounts of un-remedied harms or disputed human rights claims. The actual suffering of a person or persons can ignite the flame of conscience and personal moral conviction that I see as the first stage of this learning process. Inspired by a feeling for the human experience, learners are motivated to research and formulate claims or plan campaigns, as they apply established norms and standards, and engage in practice ethical reasoning to justify them and conceptualize potential action strategies.

It should be noted that, while we as educators cannot responsibly suggest or guide learners to action, neither can we restrain it when ethical reasoning, validation of facts and a practical reading of political context impel them to act as responsible citizens, the very roles for which we educate. Responsibilities of

citizenship are often upon us before our school diplomas and university degrees have been bestowed.

Concluding Reflections

I (Reardon) hold no idealized view of the probability of rapid or widespread practice of what I propose. I really do not expect most peace educators to immediately engage in such hands-on kind of education for justice through rigorous values analysis and exigent assessment of relevant strategies, some of which are likely to entail personal and professional risks for educators and learners as they do for activists.

But I do honestly believe that such education and the learning it strives to develop is practically possible. I fervently hope some few will try it, and that in time, it will be emulated by others. It is from our collective beliefs and hopes that the whole of human rights emerged, and thus, I expect our aspirations for a just and peaceful world society will continue. I extend my thanks to the philosophers whose original queries and insights produced all human rights movements, and in particular to peace philosopher, Dale Snauwaert, who initiated this dialogue.

Thank you, Professor Reardon, for this stimulating dialogue on justice, human rights, and peace education. Over many years you have been a rich source of insight and inspiration to me, and for many others. The pedagogical framework that you outline in this dialogue is one, along with Dewey and Freire, that I have adopted as my basic orientation, an orientation that I understand as process-oriented and inquiry-based. By stipulating what each citizen is due and what, in turn, each citizen owes to each other, justice refers to the normative political principles and values that the members of a society have mutually agreed to and affirmed as the basis of the nonviolent resolution of inevitable conflict between them.

As discussed above, the principles of justice can be articulated in terms of rights and duties, and in turn, define rights as justified claims that invoke specific duties held by both individual citizens *and* the officers of the basic institutions of society. The establishment and enactment of justice is thereby the animating principle of political power (Arendt, 1963, 1970; Muller, 2014). Power is dialogical; it is based in the free public exchange of ideas that lead to reciprocal agreement. Violence is its opposite; it is the failure of political power and justice.

If we conceive justice in this way, what follows is a conception of the citizen as an *agent,* and not merely a recipient, *of justice.* As an agent of justice,

the citizen is *empowered* to engage in public discourse and judgment; to do so the citizen must have the developed capacity to engage in a range of judgments and actions, as we outlined in this dialogue. These capacities cannot be merely transmitted to citizens. *The capacities for ethical inquiry, moral reasoning, and judgment (ethical reasoning broadly defined) can be developed only through* exercise and *practice* (Rodowick, 2021). What follows is a process-oriented, inquiry-based pedagogy that we have explored in this dialogue. Its' employment is essential for the development of students' capacity to engage in ethical inquiry, moral reasoning, and judgment; in turn these capacities are necessary for the protection and realization of human rights as urgent matters of justice. The educational cultivation of these capabilities is of singular importance (Snauwaert, under review).

References

Arendt, H. (1963). *On revolution*. New York: Penguin Books.

Arendt, H. (1970). *On violence*. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company.

Baier, K. (1954). The point of view of morality. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 32*(2), 104 – 135.

Baier, K. (1958). *The moral point of view: A rational basis of ethics*: Cornell University Press.

Bobbio, N. ([1990] 1996). *The age of rights*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Brune, J. P., Stern, R., & Werner, M. H. (Eds.). (2017). *Transcendental arguments in moral theory*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Falk, R. A. (2000). *Human rights horizons: The pursuit of justice in a globalizing world*. New York: Routledge.

Feinberg, J. (2001). The nature and value of rights. In P. Hayden (Ed.), *The philosophy of human rights*. St. Paul, MN: Paragon House.

Forst, R. (2012). *The right to justification: Elements of a constructivist theory of justice* (J. Flynn, Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press.

Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The end of history and the last man*. New York: Free Press.

Fukuyama, F. (2018). *Identity : The demand for dignity and the politics of resentment* (First edition. ed.). New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Glover, J. (2000). *Humanity: A moral history of the twentieth century*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Gutmann, A. (2001). Introduction. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), *Human rights as politics and idolatory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Habermas, J. (1990). *Moral consciousness and communicative action*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Habermas, J. (1993). *Justification and application: Remarks on discourse ethics* (C. Cronin, Trans.). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Habermas, J. (1996). *Between facts and norms : Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Honneth, A. (2015). *Freedom's right: The social foundations of democratic life*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Honneth, A. (2021). *Recognition: A chapter in the history of european ideas* (J. Ganahl, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ignatieff, M. (2001). *Human rights as politics and idolatry*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Jones, C. (1999). *Global justice: Defending cosmopolitanism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Jones, C. (2001). *Global justice: Defending cosmopolitanism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kant, I. (1991 [1797]). *Metaphysics of morals* (M. Gregor, Trans. L. Denis Ed.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kymlicka, W. (1990). *Contemporary political philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

May, T. (2015). *Nonviolent resistance: A philosophical introduction*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

Muller, J.-M. (2014). *The principle of nonviolence: A philosophical path* (R. James & M. James, Trans.). Honolulu, HI: Center for Global Nonkilling.

Perry, M. J. (1998). *The idea of rights: Four inquiries*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Peters, R. S. (1966). *Ethics and education*. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Pogge, T. (2001). How should human rights be conceived? In P. Hayden (Ed.), *The philosophy of human rights*. St. Paul, MN: Paragon House.

Rawls, J. (1971). *A theory of justice*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Rawls, J. (1993). *Political liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Rawls, J. (2000). Hegel. In B. Herman (Ed.), *Lectures on the history of moral philosophy* (pp. 329-372). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rawls, J., & Freeman, S. R. (1999). *Collected papers*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Rawls, J., & Kelly, E. (2001). *Justice as fairness: A restatement*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Reardon, B. A. (2010). Meditating on the barricades: Concerns, cautions and possibilities for peace education for political efficacy. In P. Trifonas & B. L. Wright (Eds.), *Critical peace education: Difficult dialogues*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Reardon, B. A., & Snauwaert, D. T. (2011). Reflective pedagogy, cosmopolitanism, and critical peace education for political efficacy: A discussion of betty a. Reardon's assessment of the field. *In Factis Pax: Journal of Peace Education and Social Justice, 5*(1), 1-14.

Reardon, B. A., & Snauwaert, D. T. (Eds.). (2015). *Betty a. Reardon: A pioneer in education for peace and human rights*. London: Springer.

Rodowick, D. N. (2021). *An education in judgment: Hannah arendt and the humanities*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Scanlon, T. (1998). *What we owe to each other*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Scheffler, I. (1981). *Reason and teaching*. New York: Hackett.

Shue, H. (1980). *Basic rights: Subsistence, affluence, and u.S. Foreign policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Singer, P. (2011). *The expanding circle: Ethics, evolution, and moral progress*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sloan, D. (1983). *Insight-imagination: The emancipation of thought and the modern world*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing.

Sloan, D. (1997). *The recovery of wholeness*. Teachers College, Columbia University. New York.

Snauwaert, D. T. (2020). Expanding the scope of a just peace: Environmental sustainability, justice, and the foundations of a pedagogy of peace. In A. Yudkin Suliveres & A. Pascual Morán (Eds.), *Descolonizar la paz: Entramado de saberes, resistencias y posibilidades [e-book]. Antología conmemorativa 20 aniversario cátedra unesco de educación para la paz.* . Suan Juan, Puerto Rico: Universidad de Puerto Rico.

Snauwaert, D. T. (under review). *Teaching peace as a matter of justice: A philosophical and pedagogical framework*. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Press.

Stern, R. (2021). Transcendental arguments. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall*.

Vincent, R. J. (1986). *Human rights and international relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Watt, A. J. (1975). Transcendental arguments and moral principles. *Philosophical Quarterly, 25*.

Williams, R. R. (1997). *Hegel's ethics of recognition*. Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press.

Zurn, C. (2015). *Axel honneth*. London: Polity.