IN FACTIS PAX
IN KNOWLEDGE {THERE IS} PEACE
journal of peace education and social justice

Volume 2 Number 1 (2008): 88-130

http://www.infactispax.org/journal/

The Cosmopolitan Ethics of the Earth Charter:

A Framework for a Pedagogy of Peace

Dale T. Snauwaert

The University of Toledo

The purpose of this paper is to philosophically explore the Earth Charter as a cosmopolitan ethical framework for a pedagogy of peace.[1] The Earth Charter constitutes a powerful articulation of a framework of cosmopolitan ethical principles for a just, peaceful, and ecologically sustainable society. It is a deliberative product of a global civil society, derived from cross-cultural dialogue. It constitutes an "actually existing" cosmopolitan ethic. This paper will articulate the cosmopolitan ethics of the Earth Charter and as well as exploring it's potential as a foundation for a pedagogy of peace.

[1] Earth Charter, *The Earth Charter* (Earth Charter Initiative www.earthcharter.org 2000).

The paper will focus on the definition of peace articulated in Principle 16f of the Charter: "Recognize that peace is the wholeness created by right relationships with oneself, other persons, other cultures, other life, Earth, and the larger whole of which all are a part." This conception of peace will serve as the organizing framework for the articulation of the cosmopolitan ethic and corresponding pedagogical framework. It is argued that the ethical principles of The Earth Charter provide a framework for a corresponding pedagogy of peace as right relationships.

The Political Context: Peace and International Order

There are four dominant paradigms of international order: Realism, Internationalization, Imperialism, and Cosmopolitanism. Realism is a theory of international relations that denies the existence of morality in the international arena. It maintains that relations between nation-states are purely political, in the sense that they exclusively concern interests and power, not what is right or good *per se*.[2] Realism asserts an international moral skepticism: the belief that ethics has either dubious or no relevance to the action of states. This skepticism is based upon the understanding that the international arena is an anarchy, a condition wherein there exists no higher legal or moral authority than individual states and thus states act out of exclusive self-interest. For

[2] Duane L. Cady, *From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989); Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Michael Joseph Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1986). F. H. Hinsley, *Sovereignty*, Second Edition ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

the Realist, therefore, the interstate arena is anarchy, a state of relations without the existence of a sovereign power to enforce morality and law.[3] Under the conditions of anarchy, power (and fear) takes precedence over law and morality. In fact, the international anarchical system is in a continual state of war, in the sense that war is always imminent. Under the conditions of anarchy self-defense is rational. Others, however, not knowing one's intentions with certainty, will respond out of self-defense with an increase in arms. The result is escalation, leading to an increased probability of the outbreak of conflict. This phenomenon is referred to as the "security dilemma:" to defend one's self is to increase the probability of conflict: defense, pursued in order to be secure, leads to insecurity.[4] Thus, given the anarchical assumption a state of war is generated -- an inevitable and perpetual state of insecurity. The only way to maintain negative peace or a state of cold war under these conditions, that is, a state of relations free from actual fighting in the context of a state of perpetual insecurity, is through a balance of power. If power is balanced between states, wherein no one state or group of states is dominant, then a state of cold war or negative peace can be maintained without the actual outbreak of hostility, for the balance of power deters aggression by posing a

[3] Hinsley, *Sovereignty*.
[4] Robert Jervis, "The Spiral of International Insecurity.," in *Perspectives on World Politics*, ed. Richard Little & Michael Smith (New York: Routledge, 1991).

significant retaliatory threat. Hence, to avoid war a balance of power must be maintained.[5]

The basic premise of Realism, anarchy, however, can be questioned. Empirical evidence suggests that there exists a complex international and transnational network of interdependence. The existence of interdependence constitutes a world system with an international and perhaps a global scope. This interdependence has existed at least since the 17th century.[6] From this perspective the world system is not an anarchy; it is politically organized.

One view of this organization is that the world system constitutes an "international society." This is a society of nation-states. The international organization of nation-states constitutes a practical association rather than a purposive one, in that there does not exist a common good between nations, pursued in their relations with each other. Rather nations coexist and attempt to conduct their relations with each other in terms of basic moral and legal principles that allow for their peaceful coexistence. From this perspective, there exists an agreed upon equality between states, a state right to self-determination, and the universal obligation of nonintervention. In this case justice is procedural. It is constituted by a mutual respect for the equal sovereignty of each society.

---

[5] Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*; R. O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*.

[6] Alex MacGillivray, *A Brief History of Globalization: The Untold Story of Our Incredible Shrinking Planet*, 1st Carroll & Graf ed. (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2006).

Injustice is defined as the crime of aggression, the violation of nonintervention. From this perspective, peace is not achieved through a balance of power *per se* but through adherence to the above principles of international procedural justice.[7]

Another view of international political organization is *imperialism*. Imperialism posits *domination* of a single power as the means of international order. In the post-Cold War era there has been a shift to a kind of imperialism in American foreign policy. This shift was precipitated by, and constitutes a particular response to, globalization.[8] The new American imperialism is based upon the belief in the superiority of American liberalism as form of moral and political order and the use of unilateral military power to transform illiberal societies (e.g., Iraq) into liberal republics, replicas of American liberalism. It is assumed that peace will be achieved through the spread of liberalism by force.[9]

Cosmopolitanism maintains that peace can only be achieved through the establishment of a shared moral, legal, and political transnational order that guarantees the rights of all human beings and the protection of life in general. It transcends but includes the principles of international society – internationalism – by including the moral considerability of every human being. It posits a global moral community.

---

[7] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (London: Macmillan, 1977); Terry Nardin, *Law, Morality, and the Relations of States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).

[8] Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Owl Books/Henry Holt, 2004).

[9] Jurgen Habermas, *The Divided West*, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity, 2006).

Cosmopolitanism asserts the sovereignty of human dignity and reverence for life. It posits the existence of a transnational ethical framework that supersedes the authority of individual nations.[10]

From the perspective of these paradigms of international order, there is a plurality of means of achieving peace: the imperative of maintaining a *balance of power*, the imperative of an international legal order of states, the imperative of the *domination* of American liberalism, and the imperative of a cosmopolitan order. The Earth Charter posits the cosmopolitan imperative of *peace as right relationships*.

The Earth Charter: An Ethical Framework

The Earth Charter is a declaration of fundamental principles for building a just, sustainable and peaceful global society.[11] The Charter constitutes an actually existing cosmopolitan ethic in the sense that it is generated from cross-cultural deliberation; it is not merely a philosophical ideal, but a deliberative agreement of citizens around the globe. It is a democratic response emanating from global civil society; the citizens of the

[10] Sissela Bok, *Common Values* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995); Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Richard A. Falk, *Human Rights Horizons: The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World* (New York: Routledge, 2000); Habermas, *The Divided West*; David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995); Stanley Hoffman, *Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1981); Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, trans. Ted Humphrey. (Cambridge: Hackett, [1795]1983); Terry Nardin & David R. Mapel, ed., *Traditions of International Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Jacques Maritain, *The Rights of Man and Natural Law* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1958).

[11] Charter, *The Earth Charter*.

world posit, in the form of the Earth Charter, a global political framework founded upon the ethical imperative of peace. It constitutes a cosmopolitan conception of international society.

The Charter articulates principles in four broad areas: *Respect and Care for the Community of Life, Ecological Integrity*, *Social and Economic Justice,* and *Democracy, Nonviolence, and Peace.* However, it can be argued that the central organizing principle of the Charter, which provides a unifying framework, is Principle 16f: "Recognize that peace is the wholeness created by right relationships with oneself, other persons, other cultures, other life, Earth, and the larger whole of which all are a part." This conception of peace is based upon the recognition of interdependence and interrelationship, and it posits a holistic relational ethic. "Wholeness" implies the interrelationship and interdependence of each level of relationship. "Right" implies that the network of relationships *is ethical*. When all the levels of relationship are taken together, it constitutes a cosmopolitan conception of peace, in the sense that its intent and scope are global. Each level of relationship, however, implies a different kind of ethical of relationship; from this perspective it can be inferred, therefore, that peace involves multiple ethical considerations.

Any ethical system is comprised of the following basic elements: a system of beliefs, including basic values and goods (that serve as premises), ultimate moral attitude(s), a set of principles (rules) which define moral rights and obligations, and standards and capacities of character . The basic values of the Charter are enumerated in

Principle 1:

1. Respect Earth and life in all its diversity.
    a. Recognize that all beings are interdependent and every form of life has value regardless of its worth to human beings.
    b. Affirm faith in the inherent dignity of all human beings and in the intellectual, artistic, ethical, and spiritual potential of humanity.

This principle asserts the basic values of the ethical system of the Charter: that all living beings have intrinsic value (a value independent of their instrumental value to humans) and that human beings possess an equal inherent dignity. Each being is understood to be a "teleological center of life;" an individual living being is a "unified system of goal-oriented activities directed toward their preservation and well-being . . . an entity whose 'world' can be viewed from the perspective of *its* life."[12] These two basic values constitute the premises of the ethical system of the Charter.

The moral attitudes that logically follow from these values/premises are enumerated in Principles 1 and 2. Principle 1 asserts *respect* for life and the inherent dignity of persons, and Principle 2 asserts *care*, "Care for the community of life with understanding, compassion, and love." Respect and Care for life and human dignity are the two fundamental moral attitudes required by the Charter. A moral attitude is an understanding and outlook toward other beings that structure specific moral responses and relationships. The values of intrinsic value and dignity require the moral attitudes of

[12] Paul W. Taylor, *Respect for Nature : A Theory of Environmental Ethics*, *Studies in Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986). (p. 79)

Respect and Care for life in general and for specific manifestations of life on different levels of relationship (e.g., on the human level, respect and care for persons).

What follows from moral attitudes are duties to respond to others in particular ways. Principles pertain to rights and duties that follow from, are necessary to actualize, one's values. These duties are codified in terms of Moral Principles. The moral principles are abstract expressions of forms of conduct, of moral responses to the call of the other, which one commits to with the adoption of a moral attitude. The moral attitudes of respect and care commit one to certain modes of conduct embodied in principles on each level of relationship. A central part of the articulation of the cosmopolitan ethics of the Earth Charter is the explication of principles on each level of relationship. The four categories of principles in the Charter speak to these different levels of relationship.

Standards of character, in turn, pertain to dispositions and/or character traits that pre-dispose one toward particular choices and actions. They constitute moral resources that comprise one's moral sensibility, which enables one to act in accordance with what one understands in principle to be right. One can understand what the right thing to do is but not have the will to do it. Dispositions pertain to the will, the character, to do what is right. A disposition is a character trait that enables one to fulfill one's responsibility, as defined in principle. In addition, standards of character also entail *capacities* to respond. As Jonathon Glover posits there are two broad categories of moral capacities: restraint from doing harm and sympathy (a reaching out to others in need). These moral resources

are capacities and dispositions of consciousness and of natural human inclination that enhance our capacity to morally respond to others.[13]

What follows from the ethical system (comprised of values, attitudes, principles, and standards of character) are educational purposes. Educational purposes define the orientation of an education consistent with the imperatives of the ethical system. The purposes that follow from the ethical system of the Earth Charter include the following: awareness of basic values, cultivation of the moral attitudes of respect and care, understanding and application of the moral principles, and the development of the moral capacities necessary for right relationship with self, other persons, other cultures, other life, and the Earth. The educational purposes provide a foundation for the stipulation of a pedagogy of peace. From this perspective, a pedagogy of peace is based upon the imperatives of the ethical system. The pedagogical principles that follow from the ethical imperatives of the Charter are: self-reflection, dialogical encounter with persons, border crossing and diplomacy, encounter with nature, and ecological systems thinking. The pedagogical principles articulate the general *process of learning* through which the capacity (including understanding) for right relationships on each level is developed. The following table summarizes the framework:

Table 1 -- **The Ethical and Educational Framework of the Earth Charter**

Principle 16f: "Recognize that peace is the wholeness created by right relationships with oneself, other persons, other cultures, other life, Earth, and the larger whole of which all

[13] Jonathan Glover, *Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

are a part."

Right Relationship with	Basic Values	Moral Attitudes	Moral Principles	Standards of Character	Pedagogical Principle
Self	Human Dignity	Respect & Care for Self	Duty to care for and develop self	Self-Awareness Presence	Self-Reflection
Other Persons	Human Dignity	Respect & Care for persons	Human rights	Dialogue Integrity Judgment	Dialogical Encounters with Persons
Other Cultures	Human Dignity	Respect & Care for Peoples	Justice Ethics of self-defense	Tolerance	Border Crossing and Diplomacy
Other Life	Intrinsic value of life	Respect & Care for Life	Moral Consideration Humane treatment	Awareness of unity with life	Encounters with Nature
Earth	Intrinsic value of life	Respect & Care for Earth's biosphere	Ecological Integrity	Awareness of the biosphere as a whole	Ecological Systems Thinking

What follows below is an outline of the levels of right relationship in accordance with the above ethical framework, followed by a discussion of the pedagogical principles based upon this ethical framework. This discussion constitutes an outline, not a full explication of the framework. A full explication is beyond the scope of this short article. However, what follows does offer a template for a comprehensive articulation of pedagogy of peace founded upon the Charter's ethical imperatives.

Right Relationship with Self

On this level of relationship the attitudes of respect and care apply to the self. Right relationship with the self is the foundation of all other relationships, for it is the quality of our being that determines the quality of our relationships. What constitutes the right relationship with the self?

In the preamble of the Charter the following is stated: "Fundamental changes are needed in our values, institutions, and ways of living. We must realize that when basic needs have been met, human development is primarily about being more, not having more." (Paragraph 4) This perspective constitutes a "being orientation." At the roots of language are the two verbs: "to be" and "to have." These verbs represent the basic dimensions of our existence: having and being. Having defines the self and relationship to the world in terms of possession. It is a horizontal relation. This orientation is expressed by the phrase: "I am what I have." The Being dimension defines the self in terms of one's inner center and relationship to the world in terms of being-with rather than possession and/or control. It is a vertical relation. This orientation is articulated by the phrase: "I am that I am." The having orientation objectifies and commodifies life, a being orientation recognizes the sacredness, the intrinsic value of life. The latter orientation defines the self as one's authentic being and right relationships as awareness of our authentic being and living from, relating to other beings from that awareness.

Respect and care for the self, in turn, entails a duty to care for and develop the self; this duty invokes the imperative of a shift to a being orientation. In turn, the central moral capacity needed to fulfill the duty of care for the self is a capacity for self-

reflection and self-examination. Self-reflection requires what can be called *presence*, the capacity of being aware in the moment. When one is present in an experience it is that very presence, that consciousness of being, of existing in that moment, which is the authentic self. That self is consciousness itself, a consciousness that lies deep within and emerges when we free our selves from egoic attachment. With development this sense of self becomes an abiding presence. It isn't a self-image, a self-concept, or a personality. It is personalized being in the form of individualized conscious presence. In addition, as one's awareness of presence expands the fundamental interconnection between one's own consciousness and the being of others emerges. One becomes aware of ones' interrelationship, one's being-with, others.[14]

Right Relationship with Other Persons

On this level of relationship the attitudes of respect and care apply to the

[14] Masao Abe and William R. LaFleur, *Zen and Western Thought* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); A. H. Almaas, *Essence: The Diamond Approach to Inner Realization.* (York Beach, Maine: Samuel Weiser, Inc., 1986); Stephen Batchelor, *Alone with Others: An Existential Approach to Buddhism.* (New York: Grove Press, 1983); Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Scribners, 1970); Dalai-Lama, *Ethics for the New Millennium* (New York: Riverhead Books, 1999); Erich Fromm, *Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics* (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1947); Erich Fromm, *The Art of Being* (New York: Continuum, 1992); Erich Fromm, *The Essential Fromm: Life between Having and Being.*, ed. Rainer Funk (New York: Continuum, 1995); Erich Fromm, *To Have or to Be?* (New York: Continuum, 1976; reprint, 2000); Pierre Hadot and Aurelius Marcus, *The Inner Citadel : The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998); Thich Nhat Hanh, *Being Peace* (Berkeley, Calif.: Parallax Press, 1987); Hazrat Inayat Khan, *The Alchemy of Happiness* (London: East-West Publication, 1996); Robert A. F. Thurman, *Inner Revolution : Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Real Happiness* (New York: Riverhead Books, 1998).

relationship with other persons; the attitudes are shaped by the recognition of inherent human dignity. The attitudes of respect and care for persons can be expressed as a postulate of what one is entitled to as a human being:

> All individuals are morally equal qua individuals ... [and] are entitled to equal autonomy and equal respect as subjects of moral choice capable of devising and pursuing their own respective life plans.[15]

Or it can be expressed as an obligatory imperative as in Kant's second formulation of the Categorical Imperative:

> Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.[16]

Or it can be expressed as the basic sacredness of the human person:

> . . . each and every human being is sacred -- each and every human being is 'inviolable,' has 'inherent dignity and worth,' is 'an end in himself, or the like.[17]

The ideal of human dignity answers the moral limit question: Why be moral? Why respect and care for other human beings? One could answer the limit question by asserting that moral principle demands that we treat others with respect and care. Adherence to moral principle is necessitated by the fact that the principle reflects respect for the intrinsic dignity/value of other human beings. We should be moral, not out of

---

[15] Michael Rosenfeld, *Affirmative Action and Justice: A Philosophical and Constitutional Inquiry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). (p. 20-22).
[16] Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964). (p. 429)
[17] Michael J. Perry, *The Idea of Rights: Four Inquiries* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). (p. 5)

adherence to the moral law, moral principle, or divine command *per se*, but out of respect and care for the intrinsic value and dignity of others. This is an ethic that is based in the existence of others who possess an equal dignity to our own. It is an ethic that is emanates from what Levinas referred to as "the call of the other."[18] The very existence of other human beings contains a *universal* moral imperative to respond to human dignity with care and respect.

> What follows is the principle of respect and care for persons:
>
> . . . because every human being is sacred . . . certain choices should be made and certain other choices rejected; in particular, certain things ought not to be done to any human being and certain other things ought to be done for every human being.[19]

This perspective invokes the idea of human rights. The idea of human rights is the dominant way of articulating the demands of morality in the modern world . Rights talk has become the *lingua franca* of ethics. The language of rights and duties give expression to or reflect a moral substance that *is* indispensable, namely imperative responses to human dignity. In essence rights and duties are a way of expressing what one must do or can never do to another human being who possesses an equal inherent dignity . It is a way of articulating what is right and wrong grounded in human value. By virtue of their dignity all human beings have rights. However, rights entail responsibilities. Therefore, the moral principles applicable to the right relationship with

---

[18] Emmanuel Levinas and Nidra Poller, *Humanism of the Other* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003).
[19] Perry, *The Idea of Rights: Four Inquiries*. (p, 5)

other persons can be articulated in terms of human rights and their correlative duties.[20]

The following rights are enumerated in the Earth Charter:

> 11. Affirm gender equality and equity as prerequisites to sustainable development and ensure universal access to education, health care, and economic opportunity.
>
> a. Secure the human rights of women and girls and end all violence against them.
>
> b. Promote the active participation of women in all aspects of economic, political, civil, social, and cultural life as full and equal partners, decision makers, leaders, and beneficiaries.
>
> c. Strengthen families and ensure the safety and loving nurture of all family members.
>
> 12. Uphold the right of all, without discrimination, to a natural and social environment supportive of human dignity, bodily health, and spiritual well-being, with special attention to the rights of indigenous peoples and minorities.
>
> a. Eliminate discrimination in all its forms, such as that based on race, color, sex, sexual orientation, religion, language, and national, ethnic or social origin.
>
> b. Affirm the right of indigenous peoples to their spirituality, knowledge, lands and resources and to their related practice of sustainable livelihoods.
>
> c. Honor and support the young people of our communities, enabling them to fulfill their essential role in creating sustainable societies.
>
> d. Protect and restore outstanding places of cultural and spiritual significance.

Protecting, promoting, and aiding the human rights of other persons is based, in turn, upon the following standards and capacities of character: "thinking," discernment, and sympathy. What capacities, dispositions, consciousness equip us to respond to the

---

[20] Norberto Bobbio, *The Age of Rights* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, [1990] 1996); Falk, *Human Rights Horizons: The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World*; Michael Ignatieff, *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry*, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Maritain, *The Rights of Man and Natural Law*; Perry, *The Idea of Rights: Four Inquiries*; R. J. Vincent, *Human Rights and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

inherent dignity of the other? The discussion below will focus on the following basic moral resources: the capacity for dialogical relationships, presence, thinking, judgment, authentic self-hood, and conscience. As Jonathon Glover posits there are two broad categories of moral capacities: respect and sympathy. Respect is a negative capacity in that it is what restraints us from doing harm, while sympathy is a positive capacity in the sense that it defines our capacity to respond to the other.[21] The moral resources can be understood in this way.

Capacity for Dialogical Relations: morality rests upon an awareness of our fundamental interconnection and our capacity to relate and respond to the other authentically as a subject.

Integrity -- Capacity for Thinking: Hannah Arendt conceives "thinking" as a soundless, internal dialogue. Thinking is a dialogue with one's self. Thinking is thus a reflective activity wherein one literally stops and steps back *within* one's self to reflect upon the meaning and value of the thought. From a moral perspective it is "better to suffer wrong than to do wrong." Why? The moral stand here is the coherence of the self. We could call it "integrity." The two-in-one structure of thinking, the internal dialogue, is a capacity of awareness and memory of self-consistency. If I do X, can I live with myself? In Plato's *Gorgias* Socrates states metaphorically: "it would be better for me that my lyre or a chorus I direct were out of tune and loud with discord, and that most

[21] Glover, *Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century*.

men should not agree with me and contradict me, rather than that I, being one, should be out of tune with myself and contradict myself (482b-c)." If I do X, then I will not be able to live with my self and therefore I can't do it. The internal discord, disharmony, contradiction is too much to bear. As Arendt writes: "Morality concerns the individual in his singularity. The criterion of right and wrong . . . depends in the last analysis neither on habits and customs . . . nor on a command . . . but on what I decide with regard to myself. In other words, I cannot do certain things, because having done them I will no longer be able to live with myself."[22]

In a negative sense the moral standard here is self-contempt or internal discord. The inevitability of self-contempt, if I commit certain acts, stops me. The positive side of the moral standard of self-contempt is being-peace, is being at peace with one's self. (p.108). However, it is the threaten loss of internal peace that stops me from causing harm to others. Thinking in this sense does not tell one what to do; it only prevents one from acting in harmful ways. It is negative in that it restraints action. It is the internal moral resource correlative to negative rights and the duty to avoid causing harm.[23]

Judgment -- From the perspective of Arendt's reading of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, judgment pertains to the determination of value and of Right in particular cases, cases wherein general principles are not readily applicable. These are cases

[22] Hannah Arendt and Jerome Kohn, *Responsibility and Judgment*, 1st ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 2003). (p. 97)
[23] Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Penguin Books, 1994); Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind* (New York: Harcourt, 1971); Arendt and Kohn, *Responsibility and Judgment*.

wherein the general is found within the particular. This situation defines the context of every day moral decision-making. There is valid moral principle, but the application of these principles within the unique contexts comprised of divergent particulars requires judgment. Judgment is akin to taste. There is no logical rule that can determine beauty in all cases, just as there is no general rule that will determine what is right in all situations.[24]

Judgment is contingent upon the enlargement of the mind. One enlarges one's mind, one's perspective and capacity for judgment, by taking into consideration the judgments of others. This what Kant refers to as "impartiality." One's own judgment is informed by the judgments of others. One therefore does not make a judgment in isolation from others, but in communion with them. Judgment is a function of multi-perspective taking – taking into consideration the perspectives of others to inform your own determination. This capacity depends upon one's ability of empathy, to take the other's perspective, and imagination, to hold that perspective in one's mind in the abstract. The greater the enlargement of the mind the greater one's judgment will be informed by others, the sounder the judgment. This moral capacity is thus also dialogical, entailing the necessity to communicate one's judgments in public. Judgment

[24] Hannah Arendt, "Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy," in *Hannah Arendt Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992).

ultimately requires a public space, a public forum, wherein opinions and perspectives can be communicated.[25]

Right Relationship with Other Cultures

On this level the attitudes of respect and care apply to the relationship with other cultures; these attitudes are shaped by the recognition of human dignity inherent in collectivities of people. Thus, the basic moral attitude on this level is respect and care for peoples. There are two dimensions and corresponding moral principles to this level of relationship. As Sissela Bok maintains:

> Certain basic values necessary to collective survival have had to be formulated in every society. A minimalist [i.e., thin] set of such values can be recognized across societal and other boundaries.
>
> These basic values are indispensable to human coexistence, though far from sufficient, at every level of personal and working life and of family, community, national, and international relations. [26]

These basic values pertain to rights, duties and norms in three areas: (1) positive duties of mutual care and support, (2) negative duties of no harm to others, and (3) norms of rudimentary fairness and procedural justice.[27] Bok maintains that these values are necessary for the kind of trust that underlies all social relations and thus are essential for societal order on all levels, including international and intercultural. The principle of no harm invokes the ethics of self-defense and self-determination; the positive duties of mutual care and support require international distributive justice (i.e., a right to a fair

[25] ibid.
[26] Bok, *Common Values*. (p, 13 and 19)
[27] ibid., p. 14-16.

share of the world's resources and the economic value of their productivity), and norms of fairness (e.g., rules of coexistence; rights to diplomatic deliberation).

Principle 16c of the Earth Charter states: "Demilitarize national security systems to the level of a non-provocative defense posture, and convert military resources to peaceful purposes, including ecological restoration." This principle posits an ethic of self-defense. The ethics of self-defense is based upon a right (morally justified claim) to self-determination, entailing freedom from the coercive interference of other peoples.

From the perspective of international society, there is inherent moral equality between states, a state right to self-determination, and the universal obligation of nonintervention. In this case justice is constituted by a mutual respect for the equal sovereignty of each society. Injustice is therefore defined as the crime of aggression, the violation of nonintervention.[28] From a cosmopolitan perspective, it can be argued that state right is a manifestation of individual right. States, democratic and non-democratic, derive their sovereignty, their rights and duties, from the consent of the people.[29] The principle of nonintervention thus rests on the individual right of security of person and

[28] Bull, *The Anarchical Society*; Nardin, *Law, Morality, and the Relations of States*.
[29] Hinsley, *Sovereignty*; Stanley Hoffman, "Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention," in *The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Interventin*, ed. Stanley Hoffman (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996); Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*; Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973).

self-determination, which in turn is based upon the recognition of the equal inherent dignity of each person.[30]

While there exists a *prima facie* moral presumption against the use of force , when the integrity of a people is threatened or violated, the aggrieved party has a right to protect itself and to restore a just peace, and others, friends and allies, are justified in intervening to protect or restore that peace. This intervention often entails a justified use of force. The obligation to act for the protection of peace is founded upon a right of self-defense and an obligation to help defend others.[31]

---

[30] Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*; Hoffman, *Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics*; Martha Nussbaum, "Kant and Cosmopolitanism," in *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal*, ed. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997); Michael Walzer, *On Toleration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); Michael Walzer, *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (South Bend, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1996).

[31] Joseph L. Allen, *War: A Primer for Christians* (Dallas: First Maguire Center/Southern Methodist University Press, [1991] 2001); U.S. Catholic Bishops, "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response," in *Just War Theory*, ed. Jean Bethke Elshtain (New York: New York University Press, [1983] 1992); Joseph Boyle, "Just War Thinking in Catholic Natural Law," in *The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives*, ed. Terry Nardin (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1996); Cady, *From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum*; Jean Bethke Elshtain, ed., *Just War Theory* (New York: New York University Press, 1992); John Finnis, "The Ethics of War and Peace in the Catholic Natural Law Tradition," in *The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives*, ed. Terry Nardin (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1996); Sohail H. Hashmi, "Interpreting the Islamic Ethics of War and Peace," in *The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives*, ed. Terry Nardin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Robert L. Holmes, "Can War Be Morally Justified? The Just War Theory," in *Just War Theory*, ed. Jean Bethke Elshtain (New York: New York University Press, [1989] 1992); Robert L. Holmes, *On War and Morality* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Terry Nardin, ed., *The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives* (Princeton, NJ:

In recent thinking concerning just cause an additional justification has emerged, one that we will discuss more thoroughly below: humanitarian intervention.[32] This justification is not centered on inter-state aggression; it concerns intra-state aggression. If a government engages in or allows heinous violations of human rights, attacks its own people (e.g., genocide), then the violation of the principle of nonintervention is justifiable in order to protect the rights of the citizenry against threats perpetrated or allowed by their own government.

In turn, if national sovereignty is thereby contingent, then the principle of nonintervention is not absolute. If a sovereign national government commits or allows clear and significant violations of the human rights of its own citizens, committing crimes against humanity (e.g., genocide), then its claim to sovereignty is no longer legitimate, for it has failed to perform its primary duty as a government, the protection of the human dignity of its citizens; through its own actions it has invalidated the social contract. In such cases the international community is morally justified, perhaps even obligated, to intervene. Such a nullification of sovereignty and the principle of nonintervention must be confined to heinous actions, to crimes against humanity recognized by the

---

Princeton University Press, 1996); Paul Ramsey, *The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility* (New York: University Press of America, [1968] 1983); James Turner Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); James Turner Johnson, *Morality and Contemporary Warfare* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

[32] Oliver and Woodhouse Ramsborth, Tom, *Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualization* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

international community to prevent the idea of humanitarian intervention from devolving into a specious justification for aggression.[33] The legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is indicative of a cosmopolitan order.

The moral principles for moral decision-making concerning both self-defense and the right conduct of that defense has been developed by the Just War tradition: the moral principles of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* respectively.

The Just War tradition has established criteria for deciding whether or not the use of force is justifiable. These criteria comprise what is traditionally referred to as *jus ad bellum*. These criteria assume a positive presumption for a just peace and a basic *prima facie* presumption against violence. Historically *jus ad bellum* criteria have included the following principles: just cause, right authority, right intention, proportionality, reasonable hope of success, and last resort. The above criteria of *jus ad bellum* constitute the elements of a morally justified use of force. Self-defense and humanitarian intervention are the only just causes.

If the end of just war theory is the protection of human dignity, including the protection of social orders consistent with dignity, then the use of force itself, the levels, means, and targets of force, must also be consistent with the imperative to protect human

[33] Bishops, "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response."; Deen K. Chatterjee and Don E. Scheid, *Ethics and Foreign Intervention*, *Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Public Policy* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Hoffman, "Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention."; Ramsborth, *Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualization*; Walzer, *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad*.

dignity. This is the consideration of *jus in bello*, or the right conduct of war. At issue in the consideration of the war convention is the question of the human rights of both combatants and noncombatants.

The first principle of *jus in bello*, proportionality of means, pertains to the law of war. It specifies limits on the level and means of force in an attempt to avoid unnecessary harm, that is, to maintain a proportionate degree of harm done to combatants relative to the good achieved. This concern for the limiting warfare through a concern for proportionality is founded upon the recognition of the human rights a combatants . The second principle of *jus in bello*, the principle of discrimination, mandates noncombatant immunity. The intentional killing of innocents as a military strategy is never justifiable. The intentional killing of noncombatants is a War Crime.[34]

These principles define the parameters of an ethics of self-defense as well as the basic relationship between peoples in terms of their right to sovereignty (self-determination) and freedom from the coercive interference of others.

The Peoples of the world also have a right, a morally justifiable claim, to a fair share of the world's resources and the economic value of their productivity. This claim

[34] John C. Ford, "The Morality of Obliteration Bombing," in *War and Morality*, ed. Richard A. Wasserstrom (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970); Roy and David Rieff Gutman, ed., *Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999); Paul Ramsey, *War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern War Be Conducted Justly?* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1961); Michael Walzer, "Moral Judgment in Time of War," in *War and Morality*, ed. Richard A. Wasserstrom (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970); Richard A. Wasserstrom, ed., *War and Morality* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970).

calls for global distributive justice. Global distributive justice is a manifestation of individual economic and social human rights. The obligations inherent in these rights define the moral principles of distributive justice.[35] The following principles of the Earth Charter illuminate a conception of global distributive justice:

> 3a. Ensure that communities at all levels guarantee human rights and fundamental freedoms and provide everyone an opportunity to realize his or her full potential.
> b. Promote social and economic justice, enabling all to achieve a secure and meaningful livelihood that is ecologically responsible.
>
> 7 e. Ensure universal access to health care that fosters reproductive health and responsible reproduction.
>
> 8 c. Ensure that information of vital importance to human health and environmental protection, including genetic information, remains available in the public domain.
>
> 9. Eradicate poverty as an ethical, social, and environmental imperative.
> a. Guarantee the right to potable water, clean air, food security, uncontaminated soil, shelter, and safe sanitation, allocating the national and international resources required.
> b. Empower every human being with the education and resources to secure a sustainable livelihood, and provide social security and safety nets for those who are unable to support themselves.
> c. Recognize the ignored, protect the vulnerable, serve those who suffer, and enable them to develop their capacities and to pursue their aspirations.
>
> 10. Ensure that economic activities and institutions at all levels promote human development in an equitable and sustainable manner.
> a. Promote the equitable distribution of wealth within nations and among nations.
> b. Enhance the intellectual, financial, technical, and social resources of developing nations, and relieve them of onerous international debt.
> c. Ensure that all trade supports sustainable resource use, environmental

[35] Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Henry Shue, *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Peter Singer, *One World : The Ethics of Globalisation* (Melbourne: Text Pub., 2002).

protection, and progressive labor standards.
d. Require multinational corporations and international financial organizations to act transparently in the public good, and hold them accountable for the consequences of their activities.

Since the intercultural and international level of right relationship is also based upon human dignity and entails respect and care for persons codified in human rights, the standards of character and capacities for moral response on this level of right relationship also include the capacities for respect and care for persons. There is, however, an additional capacity on this level: tolerance. Toleration is the basis of peaceful coexistence in the face of difference. Tolerance is a graded, dynamic reality, moving along a continuum from resigned acceptance (indifference generated from exhaustion in the face of battling difference, throwing up of one's hands and giving into the inevitability of difference in spite of every effort to suppress it), to benign indifference (the position that it takes all kinds, a general kind of neutrality), to moral stoicism (a formal recognition of the other's rights), to openness (a genuine respect for the other), to enthusiastic endorsement of difference (recognition and support of the value of the other's beliefs).[36] As one becomes more tolerant one moves in the direction of mutual respect and beyond to endorsement. Intolerance denotes a fundamental lack of capacity to respect the other's humanity. Right relationship with other cultures, respect and care for peoples, is contingent upon a capacity for tolerance, including at least openness, to the other.

[36] Walzer, *On Toleration*.

The cosmopolitan position maintains in turn that common humanity manifests differently in terms of the plurality of human cultures. The social construction of culture and the dialogical formation of identity are respectively founded upon a common humanity. Each person is both a member of a particular culture and the human community. Thus, equal respect yields a high tolerance for cultural diversity, for equal respect demands that one be open to the other's culture in order to respect them as a human being, since their culture is a manifestation of their humanity. Not being open to the other's culture is to disrespect their humanity and thus violate the principle of equal respect for persons.[37]

In terms of community, to maintain this level of tolerance one must recognize a common humanity with others of different cultures. Toleration is based in an understanding of human commonality. They are mutually inclusive. In this perspective respect/toleration and commonality are not only compatible but require each other. Respect/toleration and commonality are not antithetical or in tension as in the three perspectives above; in the cosmopolitan view one does not have to be sacrificed for the other. The recognition of human commonality provides the foundation upon which multicultural tolerance is achieved.

Right Relationship with Other Life

On this level of relationship the attitudes of respect and care apply to the

[37] Martha Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).

relationship with non-human beings; the attitudes are shaped by the recognition of the intrinsic value of all life forms. From an anthropocentric perspective, human flourishing requires ecological sustainability, and thus there is a human right to environmental sustainability. From an ecological perspective, are other non-human beings morally considerable? Do human beings have moral duties to aid, protect, and avoid harming other living beings?

The inclusion of the natural world in the moral community is necessary for its moral consideration. What follows from this premise is the proposition that the construction of an environmentally sensitive ethic must be founded upon the establishment of criteria for the extension of moral consideration to nonhuman beings. Anthropocentric theory defines the value of nonhumans instrumentally as being valuable only insofar as they have value to human beings. Ecocentric theory defines the value of nonhumans intrinsically as possessing value independently of human judgment. If an individual is deemed not to have intrinsic value, then that individual cannot in principle be a member of the moral community. The individual may possess value, but it is contingent upon its utility to the members of the moral community. Thus, if the expansion of moral community to include nature is based upon the recognition of its intrinsic value, and if anthropocentric theory rejects the proposition of intrinsic value, then the expansion of moral community, and therefore the moral consideration of nature, cannot be achieved anthropocentrically. The strongest argument for the establishment of moral consideration is intrinsic value, for it establishes the inviolability of moral

consideration rather than resting it on the contingent grounds of instrumental value.[38]

What follows from intrinsic value and in turn the moral considerability of life is the fundamental moral principle of humane treatment. Humane treatment invokes an obligation to prevent undue harm to all living beings and protect and sustain their well being whenever possible. This obligation requires a moral calculus for the adjudication of conflicts of interest between human beings and other species. If all beings have intrinsic value and are morally considerable, on what grounds do we adjudicate the inevitable conflict between their interests? Moral consideration does not imply that justifiable discriminations cannot be made nor does it imply equal treatment per se. Moral considerability does not negate the possibility of articulating principles for justifiable discrimination, and therefore, the grounds for the adjudication of conflict. At a minimum however, humane treatment is obligatory. The following Earth Charter principles articulate the right relationship with other life:

> **1. Respect Earth and life in all its diversity.**
> a. Recognize that all beings are interdependent and every form of life has value regardless of its worth to human beings.
>
> 5c. Promote the recovery of endangered species and ecosystems.
> d. Control and eradicate non-native or genetically modified organisms harmful to native species and the environment, and prevent introduction of such harmful organisms.

[38] Eugene C. Hargrove, *Foundations of Environmental Ethics* (Denton, TX: Environmental Ethics Books, 1996); Andrew Light and Holmes Rolston, ed., *Environmental Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006); Holmes Rolston, *Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World*, *Ethics and Action* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988); Taylor, *Respect for Nature : A Theory of Environmental Ethics*.

e. Manage the use of renewable resources such as water, soil, forest products, and marine life in ways that do not exceed rates of regeneration and that protect the health of ecosystems.

The moral capacities already discussed on the other levels of relationship can be enlarged to encompass relations with other living beings. Self-reflection, presence, dialogue, integrity, judgment, and tolerance are all capacities that are necessary for right relationships with non-human beings. There is, however, an additional capacity on this level: awareness of the unity of life. In the Buddhist tradition this existential interrelatedness is referred to variously as interbeing, dependent co-origination, symbios, causal origination, among others.[39] From the perspective of the I-Thou relationship and existential interconnection, morality rests upon an awareness of our fundamental interconnection.

Right Relationship with Earth (the biosphere as an integrated ecological whole)

On this level of relationship the attitudes of respect and care apply to the relationship with the biosphere as an integrated ecological whole; these attitudes are shaped by the recognition of the intrinsic value of the earth's biosphere. From this perspective the fundamental moral principle is ecological integrity. This principle is expressed in Aldo Leopold's "land ethic:" "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends

[39] Dalai-Lama, *Ethics for the New Millennium*; Hanh, *Being Peace*.

otherwise."[40] The integrity of the biosphere, its well being as a whole is the primary moral concern. This concern in turn requires an awareness of the biosphere as an integrated whole. This awareness is the fundamental moral capacity on this level of relationship.

Pedagogy of Peace

What is the *process of learning* though which the capacity (including understanding) for right relationships on each level is developed? The pedagogical principles that follow from the ethical imperatives of the Charter are: self-reflection, dialogical encounter with persons, border crossing and diplomacy, encounter with nature, and ecological systems thinking. These pedagogical principles articulate the general *process of learning* through which the capacity (including understanding) for right relationships is developed.

The educational purposes that follow from the ethics of the right relationship with one's self are awareness of one's own human dignity, the cultivation of respect and care for self, an understanding and application of the duty to care for and develop one's self, and the cultivation of the capacity for self awareness and presence. The *process of learning* through which these values, attitudes and capacities are developed is *self-reflection.* Right relationship with one's self is fostered through critical self-examination, an internal reflection on one's inner life, including one's values, choices, understandings,

[40] Aldo Leopold, "The Land Ethic," in *Environmental Ethics*, ed. Andrew and Holmes Rolsoton III Light (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006).

motivations, emotions, conscious and unconscious. Care of the self requires continual self-examination. The "unexamined life is not worth living." It is the primary process through which we care for and develop the self.[41]

The educational purposes that follow from the ethical imperatives of the right relationship with other persons are Awareness of the human dignity of others, Cultivation of respect and care persons, Understanding human rights, and the Development of capacity for dialogue, integrity, & judgment. The understanding of rights includes knowledge of the scope and content of human rights, the range of justifications for rights, the nature and politics of institutions designed to enforce rights, the multidimensional nature of human relationships, the nature and origins of violence (both direct and indirect), among many other understandings.

The *process of learning* through which these values, attitudes and capacities are developed is *dialogical encounters with other persons.* Human beings are social by nature; we live in a web of relationships with each other.[42] Morality *is*

---

[41] Dalai-Lama, *Ethics for the New Millennium*; Michel Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College De France, 1981-82*, ed. Frederic Gros, trans. Arnold I. Davidson (New York: Picador, 2005); Pierre Hadot, *What Is Ancient Philosophy?* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); Pierre Hadot and Arnold Ira Davidson, *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault* (New York: Blackwell, 1995).

[42] Batchelor, *Alone with Others: An Existential Approach to Buddhism*; Mary Field Belenky, Blythe McVicker Clinchy, Nancy Rule Goldberger and Jill Mattuck Tarule, *Women's Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice and Mind* (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Buber, *I and Thou*; Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); The-Dalai-Lama, *Ethics for the New Millennium* (New York: Riverhead Books, 1999).

dialogical. The logic of reciprocity inherent in morality represents, is a manifestation of, that web of relations. Duty to others is not merely a logical function but an imperative that follows from our interrelation with others as moral agents. We live in relation with other beings who possess equal dignity and these *relations* entail certain obligations to others. If we violate our duty, the transgression is not merely that the laws of logic or reason have been violated but that someone's dignity has been violated. This violation is the contradiction, the hypocrisy that constitutes the moral transgression. As Michael Perry suggests, the language of principle, of rights and duties, can be foregone, what is important is what they are intended to protect: human dignity. Following Levinas, it is the call of the other, the call of the other's dignity that defines responsibility. From this perspective, the structure of morality is *dialogical.*

In his classic book *I and Thou* Martin Buber articulates a conceptualization of human relationships, in terms of his notions of the I-It and I-Thou relationships, which forms the basis of a dialogical understanding of morality.[43] The *I-Thou* relationship is an encounter, a meeting of subjectivities. In this relationship one is able "to meet and know the other in his concrete uniqueness and not just as a content of one's experience."[44] This encounter constitutes a direct experience of the other in-itself. The Thou is the subjective interiority of the other. One is apprehending the other as a subject, as one who possesses a subjective interiority and dignity and not merely as an object. The I-Thou encounter is

[43] Buber, *I and Thou*.
[44] Maurice Friedman, "Introduction," in *Between Man and Man*, ed. Martin Buber (New York: Macmillan, 1965). p. xv

one that transcends a surface perception of the other as an object. It is a way of relating that opens one to an apprehension of the subjectivity, the interiority of the other. A dialogical encounter entails the extension of one's subjective presence to meet the subjective presence of the other being one is encountering, without losing the distinction of one's own individuality. In this experience one becomes aware of the interrelated and interdependent nature of being. On an existential level there exists a fundamental interconnection between one's self and other beings. As Buber suggests, "we live in the currents of universal reciprocity."[45] The I-Thou encounter constitutes an awareness of that reciprocity. This encounter is made possible by the maintenance of the I as a self-conscious subjectivity, in the sense that only a self-conscious subject can meet a subject. It is only in self-consciousness that we can be authentically *present* to another and only in Presence is the You revealed.

The process of learning through which the capacity for dialogical relationships with other persons is developed entails first, the direct experience of being treated as a subject by others and second, being engaged in various forms of dialogue with others. The pedagogical practice of dialogue throughout the curriculum cultivates a capacity for dialogical relationships and thus fosters the capacity for right relationships with other persons.

[45] Buber, *I and Thou*. p. 67

The educational purposes that follow from the ethical imperatives of the right relationship with other cultures and peoples are Awareness of the dignity of other cultures, Cultivation of respect and care peoples, Understanding justice and the ethics of self defense, and the development of the capacity for tolerance. These purposes entail an understanding of world history, comparative culture, the ethics of war and peace, the nature and causes of aggression and injustice, and the nature of economic globalization and global distributive justice, among other understandings. In addition, intercultural knowledge entails an understanding of cosmopolitan multiculturalism. Cosmopolitanism posits the existence of a human commonality, which extends the moral community, and thus, equal respect, to all human beings.

The *process of learning* through which these values, attitudes and capacities are developed is *border crossing and diplomacy.* It is through encounters with other peoples consistent with the imperatives of cosmopolitan ethics that the capacity for right relationships with other peoples can be cultivated. The pedagogical approach here is to place the student in the role of an ambassador who needs to develop a range of attitudes, skills, understandings, and capacities to cross borders diplomatically consistent with the imperatives of cosmopolitan ethics.

The educational purposes that follow from the ethical imperatives of rights relationships with other Life forms are Awareness of the intrinsic value of life, Cultivation of respect and care for life, Understanding the moral principle of humane

treatment, Development of capacity for awareness of the unity of life.

The *process of learning* through which these values, attitudes and capacities are developed is *encounters with nature.* Open, sustained, wide encounters with the natural world, consistent with the ethical imperative of moral consideration and humane treatment, is the means to develop the capacity for rights relationships with other living beings. Encounters with nature will lead to understanding and empathy, revealing the intrinsic value of life and the imperative to treat other living beings with care and respect.

The purpose of education from the perspective of the right relationship with Earth is the awareness of the intrinsic value of the biosphere, a cultivation of respect and care for the biosphere, an understanding of ecological integrity and the development of awareness of the biosphere as an integrated whole.

The *process of learning* through which these values, attitudes and capacities are developed is *ecological systems thinking.* How do we develop in students an awareness and understanding of the interconnection and interdependence of the biosphere? A first step is to expose them to a mode of thought that understands reality in terms of process and systems. We need to learn to see the interconnections, the integration, the unity of the whole. We live in and are an integrated part of an interdependent ecological system. It is through engagement with systems thinking that helps cultivate the awareness of the whole and in turn the capacity of right relationship with it.

This set of pedagogical principles are a means to develop the capacity of right

relationships on each respective level consistent with the cosmopolitan and ecological ethical imperatives of the Earth Charter. They point us in a particular educational direction that emphases dynamic processes of learning as the key to the development of the capacity for moral responsiveness and thus right relationships.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Earth Charter offers a comprehensive and holistic framework for a cosmopolitan ethic and a pedagogy of peace. It constitutes an alternative ethical response to globalization that is centered in justice, peace, and environmental sustainability. It also provides a powerful articulation of the core principles of pedagogy of peace as right relationships. In contrast to the imperative of maintaining a *balance of power*, the imperative of an international legal order of states, and the imperative of the *domination* of American liberalism, the Earth Charter posits a cosmopolitan imperative of *peace as right relationships* and a holistic pedagogy of peace.

This article offers an outline of the levels of right relationship in accordance with the ethical framework of the Charter, including the articulation of educational purposes. What is needed is a full explication of the framework as well as the articulation of a complete philosophy of peace education based upon it. However, this article attempts to offer is a template for a comprehensive articulation of a pedagogy of peace founded upon the Charter's ethical imperatives.

Bibliography

Abe, Masao, and William R. LaFleur. *Zen and Western Thought*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985.

Allen, Joseph L. *War: A Primer for Christians*. Dallas: First Maguire Center/Southern Methodist University Press, [1991] 2001.

Almaas, A. H. *Essence: The Diamond Approach to Inner Realization.* York Beach, Maine: Samuel Weiser, Inc., 1986.

Arendt, Hannah. *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. New York: Penguin Books, 1994.

———. "Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy." In *Hannah Arendt Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, edited by Ronald Beiner, 3-88. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992.

———. *The Life of the Mind*. New York: Harcourt, 1971.

Arendt, Hannah, and Jerome Kohn. *Responsibility and Judgment*. 1st ed. New York: Schocken Books, 2003.

Batchelor, Stephen. *Alone with Others: An Existential Approach to Buddhism*. New York: Grove Press, 1983.

Beitz, Charles R. *Political Theory and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Belenky, Mary Field, Blythe McVicker Clinchy, Nancy Rule Goldberger and Jill Mattuck Tarule. *Women's Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice and Mind.* New York: Basic Books, 1986.

Bishops, U.S. Catholic. "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response." In *Just War Theory*, edited by Jean Bethke Elshtain, pp. 77-168. New York: New York University Press, [1983] 1992.

Bobbio, Norberto. *The Age of Rights*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, [1990] 1996.

Bok, Sissela. *Common Values*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995.

Boyle, Joseph. "Just War Thinking in Catholic Natural Law." In *The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives*, edited by Terry Nardin, 40-53. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1996.

Brown, Chris. *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.

Buber, Martin. *I and Thou*. Translated by Walter Kaufman. New York: Scribners, 1970.

Bull, Hedley. *The Anarchical Society*. London: Macmillan, 1977.

Cady, Duane L. *From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989.

Charter, Earth. *The Earth Charter*: Earth Charter Initiative www.earthcharter.org 2000.

Chatterjee, Deen K., and Don E. Scheid. *Ethics and Foreign Intervention*, *Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Public Policy*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Dalai-Lama. *Ethics for the New Millennium*. New York: Riverhead Books, 1999.
Doyle, Michael W. *Ways of War and Peace*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997.
Elshtain, Jean Bethke, ed. *Just War Theory*. New York: New York University Press, 1992.
Falk, Richard A. *Human Rights Horizons: The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World.* New York: Routledge, 2000.
Finnis, John. "The Ethics of War and Peace in the Catholic Natural Law Tradition." In *The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives*, edited by Terry Nardin, 15-37. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Ford, John C. "The Morality of Obliteration Bombing." In *War and Morality*, edited by Richard A. Wasserstrom, 15-41. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970.
Foucault, Michel. *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College De France, 1981-82*. Translated by Arnold I. Davidson. Edited by Frederic Gros. New York: Picador, 2005.
Friedman, Maurice. "Introduction." In *Between Man and Man*, edited by Martin Buber. New York: Macmillan, 1965.
Fromm, Erich. *Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics*. New York: Rinehart and Company, 1947.
———. *The Art of Being*. New York: Continuum, 1992.
———. *The Art of Being*. New York: Continuum, 1992.
———. *The Essential Fromm: Life between Having and Being*. Edited by Rainer Funk. New York: Continuum, 1995.
———. *To Have or to Be?* New York: Continuum, 1976. Reprint, 2000.
Glover, Jonathan. *Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.
Gutman, Roy and David Rieff, ed. *Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999.
Gutmann, Amy. "Introduction." In *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatory*, edited by Amy Gutmann. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Habermas, Jurgen. *The Divided West*. Translated by Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge: Polity, 2006.
Hadot, Pierre. *What Is Ancient Philosophy?* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002.
Hadot, Pierre, and Arnold Ira Davidson. *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*. New York: Blackwell, 1995.
Hadot, Pierre, and Aurelius Marcus. *The Inner Citadel : The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Hanh, Thich Nhat. *Being Peace*. Berkeley, Calif.: Parallax Press, 1987.
Hargrove, Eugene C. *Foundations of Environmental Ethics*. Denton, TX: Environmental Ethics Books, 1996.

Hashmi, Sohail H. "Interpreting the Islamic Ethics of War and Peace." In *The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives*, edited by Terry Nardin, 146-66. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Held, David. *Democracy and the Global Order*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995.
Hinsley, F. H. *Sovereignty*. Second Edition ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Hoffman, Stanley. *Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1981.
———. "Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention." In *The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Interventin*, edited by Stanley Hoffman, 12-37. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996.
Holmes, Robert L. "Can War Be Morally Justified? The Just War Theory." In *Just War Theory*, edited by Jean Bethke Elshtain, pp. 195-233. New York: New York University Press, [1989] 1992.
———. *On War and Morality*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.
Ignatieff, Michael. *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry*. Edited by Amy Gutmann. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Inayat Khan, Hazrat. *The Alchemy of Happiness*. London: East-West Publication, 1996.
Jervis, Robert. "The Spiral of International Insecurity." In *Perspectives on World Politics*, edited by Richard Little & Michael Smith, 91-101. New York: Routledge, 1991.
Johnson, Chalmers. *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic*. New York: Owl Books/Henry Holt, 2004.
Jones, Charles. *Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Kant, Immanuel. *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964.
———. *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*. Translated by Ted Humphrey. Cambridge: Hackett, [1795]1983.
Leopold, Aldo. "The Land Ethic." In *Environmental Ethics*, edited by Andrew and Holmes Rolsoton III Light, 15-37. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.
Levinas, Emmanuel, and Nidra Poller. *Humanism of the Other*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003.
MacGillivray, Alex. *A Brief History of Globalization: The Untold Story of Our Incredible Shrinking Planet*. 1st Carroll & Graf ed. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2006.
Mapel, Terry Nardin & David R., ed. *Traditions of International Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Maritain, Jacques. *Natural Law: Reflections on Theory and Practice*. Edited by William Sweet. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2001.
———. *The Rights of Man and Natural Law*. London: Geoffrey Bles, 1958.

Nardin, Terry. *Law, Morality, and the Relations of States*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983.
———, ed. *The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Noddings, Nel. *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
Nussbaum, Martha. *Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997.
———. "Kant and Cosmopolitanism." In *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal*, edited by James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, 25-58. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997.
Nye, R. O. Keohane and Joseph S. *Power and Interdependence*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977.
Perry, Michael J. *The Idea of Rights: Four Inquiries*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Ramsborth, Oliver and Woodhouse, Tom. *Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualization*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996.
Ramsey, Paul. *The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility*. New York: University Press of America, [1968] 1983.
———. *War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern War Be Conducted Justly?* Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1961.
Rolston, Andrew Light and Holmes, ed. *Environmental Ethics*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.
Rolston, Holmes. *Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World*, *Ethics and Action*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988.
Rosenfeld, Michael. *Affirmative Action and Justice: A Philosophical and Constitutional Inquiry*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.
Sharp, Gene. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973.
Shue, Henry. *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
Singer, Peter. *One World : The Ethics of Globalisation*. Melbourne: Text Pub., 2002.
Smith, Michael Joseph. *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1986.
Taylor, Paul W. *Respect for Nature : A Theory of Environmental Ethics*, *Studies in Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986.
The-Dalai-Lama. *Ethics for the New Millennium*. New York: Riverhead Books, 1999.
Thurman, Robert A. F. *Inner Revolution : Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Real Happiness*. New York: Riverhead Books, 1998.
Turner Johnson, James. *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

———. *Morality and Contemporary Warfare*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.
Vincent, R. J. *Human Rights and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. New York: Basic Books, 1997.
———. "Moral Judgment in Time of War." In *War and Morality*, edited by Richard A. Wasserstrom, 54-62. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970.
———. *On Toleration*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.
———. *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad*. South Bend, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1996.
Wasserstrom, Richard A., ed. *War and Morality*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970.
Yoder, John Howard. *When War Is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-War Thinking*. Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 1984.